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SCIENCE IN HISTORY* 
 
JAMES POSKETT 
University of Warwick 
 
ABSTRACT. What is the history of science? How has it changed over the course of the 
twentieth century? And what does the future hold for the discipline? This ‘Retrospect’ provides 
an introduction to the historiography of science as it developed in the Anglophone world. It 
begins with the foundation of the Cambridge History of Science Committee in the 1940s and 
ends with the growth of cultural history in the 2000s. At the broadest level, it emphasises the 
need to consider the close relationship between history and the history of science. All too often 
the historiography of science is treated separately from history at large. But as this article 
shows, these seemingly distinct fields often developed in relation to one another. This article 
also reveals the ways in which Cold War politics shaped the history of science as a discipline. 
It then concludes by considering the future, suggesting that the history of science and the 
history of political thought would benefit from greater engagement with one another. 
 
 
Science has a history. There was once a time when such a statement might have proved 
controversial. Science was thought of as a collection of timeless truths produced by great men 
united by their genius: Aristotle, Galileo, Newton and Darwin. However, with the formation of 
the history of science as a professional discipline in the early twentieth century, this picture 
began to change.1 Science started to be thought of as a human activity, with a history just like 
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any other. Still, what exactly the history of science should consist of was open to debate. The 
collection of articles featured in this ‘Retrospect’ provides an opportunity to reflect on the most 
significant changes in the historiography of science which have taken place over the past 
seventy years.  
Drawing on the archive of The historical journal, it is largely an Anglophone 
historiography, although connections to other European traditions are highlighted throughout. 
It begins in the 1940s, with the formation of the Cambridge History of Science Committee, 
moves through the intellectual history of the 1960s, the social history of the 1970s and the 
cultural history of the 1990s and 2000s. In the process, I make four core arguments. First, 
historians of science need to address the relationship between their discipline and history. They 
have spent a lot of time reflecting on the connection between the history of science and other 
disciplines, particularly philosophy, anthropology and sociology.2 This is important, as each of 
these disciplines played a significant role in the development of the historiography of science, 
as we will see. But historians of science have spent much less time considering how their 
discipline relates to the wider historical profession.3 What exactly is the history in the history 
of science? How did changes in intellectual history, social history and cultural history affect 
what historians of science were doing? Second, this article argues that the reverse is also true. 
General historians need to consider the role that the history of science has played in the 
development of their own discipline. Many of the major developments in the practices of 
                                                        
1 For eighteenth and nineteenth-century traditions in the history of science, see Hendrik Floris Cohen, The 
Scientific Revolution: a historiographical inquiry (Chicago, IL, 1994), pp. 24-52.   
2 Steven Shapin, ‘History of science and its sociological reconstructions’, History of science, 20 (1982), Emily 
Martin, ‘Anthropology and the cultural study of science’, Science, technology and human values, 23 
(1998), and Michael Friedman, ‘History and philosophy of science in a new key’, Isis, 99 (2008). 
3 For earlier discussions of this relationship, see Arnold Thackray, ‘Science, technology, and medicine’. The 
journal of interdisciplinary history, 12 (1981), pp. 305-306 and Alfred Rupert Hall, ‘Can the history of 
science be history?’, The British journal for the history of science, 4 (1969). 
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writing history in the twentieth century had their origins in debates concerning the history of 
science. Herbert Butterfield’s Whig interpretation of history, Quentin Skinner’s political 
thought, Asa Briggs’s social history, and Roger Darnton’s cultural history were all products of 
engagement with the history of science. Third, this article reveals a broad shift in the 
disciplinary background of practitioners. In the 1940s, the history of science was written by 
scientists. Today, it is written by professional historians. Charting that change is key to 
understanding how the discipline of the history of science emerged. Finally, this article reveals 
the ways in which twentieth-century politics, particularly relating to the Cold War, transformed 
the historiography of science. Much of the debate over the nature of science and its past, as 
well as how it should be studied, reflected divergent attitudes towards capitalism and socialism. 
This raises important questions about the nature of the history of science today. Now the Cold 
War is over, what is the history of science for and how should it be written? This is a question 
I return to in the conclusion. 
 
I 
 
Charlie Dunbar Broad was neither a scientist nor a historian. Why then, in March 1944, was 
he invited to give a lecture at the University of Cambridge as part of a series on ‘Science in the 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’? With no formal historical training, Broad was closer to 
what we would now call a philosopher of science. Although he entered Trinity College to study 
Natural Sciences in 1906, he quickly switched to the Moral Sciences Tripos, specialising in 
epistemology and the philosophy of the mind. Later, as Knightsbridge Professor of Moral 
Philosophy at Cambridge, he published books with titles such as The mind and its place in 
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nature (1925).4 He also published a widely-read introduction to the philosophy of science 
entitled Scientific thought (1923). This book – a product of Broad’s time lecturing 
undergraduate scientists whilst at the University of Bristol – set out the philosophical 
consequences of recent developments in physics, including Einstein’s theory of relativity.5 
Intriguingly, alongside his appreciation of Einstein, Broad maintained a life-long interest in 
psychical research, taking seriously reports of ‘paranormal cognition’ and ‘telepathy’.6 Today, 
Broad is largely forgotten. He is not someone historians or scientists tend to read. His eclectic 
mix of science, philosophy, and the paranormal makes him an uneasy fit for the disciplinary 
and professional identities which developed over the course of the twentieth century.7 Yet this 
is precisely why Broad is such a good starting point. He is representative of the contested nature 
of the history of science as a discipline in the 1940s. What was the history of science for? And 
who should write it? In the early twentieth century, the answers to these questions were far 
from obvious. Historians, philosophers and scientists, amongst others, all tried to shape the 
meaning of science, both past and present.  
Broad delivered his lecture, entitled ‘The new philosophy: Bruno to Descartes’, at the 
invitation of the History of Science Committee at Cambridge. The lecture then formed the basis 
for an article published later that year in The Cambridge historical journal. In the article, Broad 
                                                        
4 Robert Yost, ‘The philosophy of C. D. Broad’, The philosophical review, 77 (1968) and Thomas Redpath, 
‘Cambridge philosophers VIII: C. D. Broad’, Philosophy, 72 (1997). 
5 Charlie Dunbar Broad, Scientific thought (London, 1923), pp. 3-6. 
6 Charlie Dunbar Broad, Lectures on psychical research (London, 1962). On the history of the Society for 
Psychical Research, of which Broad acted as President between 1934-5 and 1958-60, see Andreas 
Sommer, ‘Psychical research in the history and philosophy of science’, Studies in the history and 
philosophy of science, 48 (2014) and John Forrester and Laura Cameron, Freud in Cambridge 
(Cambridge, 2017), p. 362. 
7 Broad does feature in Forrester and Cameron, Freud in Cambridge, p. 109, 348, 362, 487 as part of the history 
of psychoanalysis and psychology. He also appears briefly in Ray Monk, Bertrand Russell: the ghost of 
madness, 1921-1970 (London, 2000), p. 201 and 207 as part of the history of analytic philosophy. 
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described a major transition in how the world was understood in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. He characterised this as a shift from the ‘old philosophy’ to the ‘new philosophy’. 
The ‘old philosophy’, according to Broad, was grounded in the work of Aristotle and other 
ancient Greek thinkers. Within this worldview there was no need for experiments. Ancient and 
medieval scholars instead made deductive inferences based on the properties associated with 
these four elements. In contrast, the ‘new philosophy’ rejected this way of doing things. 
Instead, men like Galileo and Francis Bacon turned to experiment in order to understand the 
natural world. And, according to Broad, this ‘combination of reasoning and experiment’ was 
‘characteristic of modern science’.8 
Broad was not alone in his understanding of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as 
a period of monumental change. Often referred to as the ‘scientific revolution’, many in the 
early twentieth century saw this as a period in which both modern science and modern society 
emerged. Writing in The making of the modern mind (1926), the philosopher John Herman 
Randall Jr. argued that ‘it was not humanism, and it was not the Reformation, that was destined 
to work the greatest revolution in the beliefs of men… it was science’.9 Similar views were 
expressed by Preserved Smith in the 1930s and Alexandre Koyré in the 1940s.10 Indeed, in 
many ways the history of science as a discipline formed around the concept of the ‘scientific 
revolution’.11 Yet, beneath this apparent consensus, there was much disagreement over how 
seventeenth-century science should be interpreted. What exactly was the source of change? 
                                                        
8 Charlie Dunbar Broad, ‘The new philosophy: Bruno to Descartes’, The Cambridge historical journal, 8 
(1944), pp. 36-44. 
9 Ierome Bernard Cohen, Revolution in science (Harvard, MA, 1985), pp. 389-395. 
10 Alexandre Koyré, ‘Galileo and Plato’, Journal of the history of ideas, 4 (1943), Alfred Rupert Hall, 
‘Alexandre Koyré and the scientific revolution’, History and technology, 4 (1987), Floris Cohen, The 
Scientific Revolution, pp. 73-87, Cohen, Revolution in science, p. 395. 
11 Floris Cohen, Scientific Revolution, p. 2 
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And how did it manifest itself? These questions would continue to occupy historians of science 
right throughout the twentieth century.12 
Broad was writing at a time when the history of science as a discipline, particularly in 
Cambridge, was undergoing a period of major transition. The original History of Science 
Committee had been established in 1936 by a group of scientists led by the biochemist Joseph 
Needham. Alongside Needham, the Committee included the Marxist crystallographer John 
Desmond Bernal as well as the pathologist Walter Pagel, a Jewish refugee who had fled Nazi 
Germany in 1933.13 Although they differed in their politics, the early members of the 
Committee were united in seeing the history of science as a way of addressing contemporary 
problems. Needham worried about overspecialisation in science, and the lack of moral 
awareness amongst scientists in an age of industrial war.14 Bernal had similar concerns, later 
writing that ‘the troubles of the times… have focused attention on the historical aspect of 
science’.15 Pagel, although more conservative than Needham and Bernal, also saw the history 
of science as part of a political project, one to rescue civilization in an age of uncertainty.16 
Together, they represented what the Harvard historian of science George Sarton called the ‘new 
humanism’. They were committed to scientific progress, but demanded that science be 
examined as part of society. Only by educating scientists in the humanities, and humanists in 
the sciences, could civilisation survive in wake of the First World War. With this aim in mind, 
the Committee established a series of annual lectures, open to all members of the university. 
                                                        
12 On debates surrounding the causes and consequences of the scientific revolution, see Floris Cohen, Scientific 
Revolution, pp. 239-377. 
13 Anna-K. Mayer, ‘Setting up a discipline: conflicting agendas of the Cambridge History of Science 
Committee, 1936–1950’, Studies in the history and philosophy of science, 31 (2000). 
14 Anna-K. Mayer, ‘Setting up a discipline II: British history of science and ‘the end of ideology’, 1931–1948’, 
Studies in the history and philosophy of science, 35 (2004), p. 46-48. 
15 John Desmond Bernal, Science in history (London, 1954), p. vii. 
16 Mayer, ‘Setting up a discipline II’, p. 48. 
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The dream, for this generation, was that the ‘unity of knowledge’ would produce the ‘unity of 
mankind’.17 
Not everyone, however, was convinced that the history of science should be left to 
scientists. Butterfield, who at the time edited of The Cambridge historical journal, attended 
some of the early lectures organised by the History of Science Committee in the 1930s. He was 
not impressed.18 Writing in The Whig interpretation of history (1931), Butterfield was famous 
for his attack on present-centred political and constitutional histories.19 For Butterfield, 
historians of science were guilty of the same mistakes. The early lectures, particularly those 
given by leading scientists such as Ernest Rutherford and William Henry Bragg, placed science 
‘in too modern a context’.20 Echoing The Whig interpretation of history, Butterfield wrote that 
‘the present-day scientist may only be interested in the past in so far as it provides these 
likenesses to the present; but the historian can almost be defined by the fact that he is interested 
in the unlikenesses’. As it stood, Butterfield saw the history of science as ‘a kind of defective 
antiquarianism’ charting ‘the discoveries of one great genius to those of another’.21  Something 
had to be done. Sure enough, Butterfield’s opportunity came in 1942 when Needham left 
Cambridge as part of a scientific mission to China. With the chair of the History of Science 
Committee vacant, Butterfield stepped in, determined to ‘set the subject on its feet’. On taking 
the chair, Butterfield radically changed the make-up of the Committee. Rather than being 
dominated by scientists, Butterfield shifted the emphasis towards the humanities, and 
                                                        
17 Geroge Sarton, ‘The new humanism’, 6 (1924), p. 2. 
18 Michael Bentley, The life and thought of Herbert Butterfield: history, science and God (Cambridge, 2011), p. 
187. 
19 Herbert Butterfield, The Whig interpretation of history (London, 1931), p. vi. 
20 Bentley, Life and thought, p. 187 and Joseph Needham and Walter Pagel (eds), Background to modern 
science (Cambridge, 1938). 
21 Hertbert Butterfield, ‘The historian and the history of science’, Bulletin of the British Society for the History 
of Science, 1 (1950), pp. 51-54. See, Butterfield, The Whig interpretation, p. 12 for comparable use of the 
terms ‘likeness’ and ‘unlikeness’. 
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particularly history. The new Committee included the economic historian Michael Postan and 
the historian of Renaissance literature Basil Willey.22 
How then did Broad fit into this? For a start, it is clear that he was invited to give the 
lecture in 1944 by Butterfield rather than Needham. And it was Butterfield who arranged for 
the publication of the subsequent article in The Cambridge historical journal. This reflected 
Butterfield’s commitment to treat the history of science as part of ‘the general history of 
thought’ rather than a separate discipline run by scientists.23 Significantly, this was the first 
time Butterfield had published one of the History of Science Committee lectures, despite the 
series having been in operation for nearly a decade at this point. With all this in mind, we can 
read Broad’s article as part of a struggle between scientists like Needham and historians like 
Butterfield over who should write the history of science and how. Unsurprisingly, Broad’s 
argument in many ways mirrored Butterfield’s approach to the history of science. The article 
opens by cautioning against seeing seventeenth-century science in terms of the present alone. 
Broad argues that ‘it is necessary to devote what may seem to be a disproportionate part of to-
day’s lecture to the old philosophy, simply because the victory of the new was in the end so 
complete and has for so long been unchallenged’. He went on to warn that the old philosophy 
‘taken out of its context, seems to be a mere childish fairy-tale too ridiculous to have ever been 
sincerely believed’. At the same time, the new philosophy ‘when explicitly stated, seems so 
trite and trivial that we cannot understand why the innovators made such a fuss’. Treating both 
the old and new philosophy on their own terms, according to Broad, was the key to 
understanding seventeenth-century science.24 
                                                        
22 Bentley, Life and thought, pp. 188-189. 
23 Butterfield, ‘The historian and the history of science’, p. 57. 
24 Broad, ‘The new philosophy’, p. 36. 
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Reading Broad’s article today it is easy to miss the influence of Butterfield’s approach 
to history. Particularly as, despite all the appeals to historicism, Broad in fact comes across as 
incredibly Whiggish. Throughout the article, Broad repeatedly celebrates the achievements of 
modern science. He identifies Galileo as a ‘genius’ and Descartes as being ‘the first person to 
have stated this law [of inertia] fully and correctly’. Much of the article is spent trying to ‘sum 
up the strong and weak points’ of various philosophies, effectively marking the homework of 
past thinkers.25 Additionally, Broad makes absolutely no reference to social or political 
contexts, something both scientists such as Needham and historians such as Butterfield saw as 
fundamental to the history of science. Marxist historians of science in particular, like Bernal, 
would also have been shocked by the lack of attention to technology and manual work, 
something they saw as part and parcel of the history of ideas. Finally, Broad’s article relies on 
a fundamental break between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ philosophies of the seventeenth century. By 
the end of the twentieth century, the revolutionary nature of the scientific revolution was 
increasingly drawn into question.26 But even in the 1940s, there were many historians and 
historians of science who did not see the Renaissance or the Reformation, along with the 
accompanying scientific movements of the time, in such progressive and revolutionary terms.27 
Broad’s article therefore presents a paradox: published by Butterfield and rejecting 
presentism, yet seemingly Whiggish nonetheless. With this in mind, Broad’s article is best read 
as an uneasy compromise between a number of competing approaches. There is clearly an 
element of Butterfield’s philosophy of history in there. However, it is important to remember 
                                                        
25 Broad, ‘The new philosophy’, p. 45-52. 
26 For a classic statement, see the first line of Steven Shapin, The Scientific Revolution (Chicago, IL, 1996), p. 1. 
27 A more gradualist understanding to scientific change characterised the work of a number of early twentieth-
century thinkers including the philosopher Pierre Duhem, the historian of science George Sarton and the 
physicist Ernest Rutherford, Floris Cohen, Scientific Revolution, pp. 45-52 and Cohen, Revolution in 
science, pp. 389. 
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that what counted as Whiggish in the 1940s was not the same as today. Butterfield did not 
reject progress or revolutionary change outright, he simply worried that Whig history, like 
Marxist history, made progress seem inevitable. After all, Butterfield himself famously 
declared in his The origins of modern science (1949) that the scientific revolution ‘outshines 
everything since the rise of Christianity’. What Butterfield wanted was a history in which the 
causes of progress were properly examined.28 This meant attending to ‘the misfires and 
mistaken hypotheses of early scientists’ as well as their successes.29 Broad’s apparently 
progressive narrative was therefore not necessarily at odds with Butterfield’s approach. But 
beyond this, it is important to recognise that Broad, by his own admission, was ‘a professional 
philosopher, and not a historian’. Trained in the British Idealist tradition by John McTaggart 
at Trinity, Broad was fundamentally interested in how the history of ideas could shed light on 
philosophical problems. He was part of a generation of philosophers, including Bertrand 
Russell and G. E. Moore, who combined an idealist training with a move into the developing 
field of analytic philosophy.30 In many ways, Broad’s article, as well as his monographs on 
Newton and Bacon, read more like Russell’s A history of Western philosophy (1945) than 
anything Butterfield wrote.31 The article is a genealogy of ideas, aimed at illuminating 
contemporary issues surrounding the nature of science and the physical world. Broad’s 
preoccupation with the detail of ideas and how they connected to one another therefore makes 
perfect sense within the tradition of analytic philosophy he practised. As Broad himself 
                                                        
28 Nick Jardine, ‘Whigs and stories: Herbert Butterfield and the historiography of science’, History of science, 
41 (2003), pp. 125-31. 
29 Herbert Butterfield, The origins of modern science (London, 1949), ix 
30 Nicholas Griffin, ‘Russell and Moore’s revolt against British idealism’, in Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford 
handbook of the history of analytic philosophy (Oxford, 2013). 
31 Charlie Dunbar Broad, The philosophy of Francis Bacon (Cambridge, 1926) and Charlie Dunbar Broad, Sir 
Isaac Newton (London, 1926). On the relationship between Broad and Russell, see Ray Monk, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein: the duty of genius (London, 1990), p. 39 and Monk, Bertrand Russell, p. 201 and 207. 
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explained in Scientific thought, the aim of philosophy was to help ‘clear up some of the 
concepts used in the natural sciences’. Broad was in fact much more interested in collaborating 
with scientists than historians. Reading Broad in light of the analytic philosophy of the time 
helps make sense of what he was trying to achieve in 1944. Yes, he adopted Butterfield’s 
approach to the study of history, particularly the emphasis on studying ideas which were 
subsequently rejected. But Broad also explicitly advanced a series of methodological and 
philosophical claims concerning the sciences in the present. As he concluded in Scientific 
thought, ‘the co-operation of philosophers and scientists is of the utmost benefit to the studies 
of both’.32 
 
II 
 
When Needham returned to Cambridge in 1948, he found the History of Science Committee 
had been transformed. Writing to a friend, he complained that ‘the committee seems to have 
become dominated by professional historians’.33  Needham was right. By the end of the Second 
World War, the History of Science Committee under Butterfield was composed largely of 
trained historians. This was in stark contrast to the 1930s when the Committee had been 
founded largely as a venue for scientists.34 But the difference between Butterfield and 
Needham’s vision for the history of science wasn’t just a question of disciplinary training. 
Butterfield and Needham clashed politically, and as a consequence, promoted very different 
intellectual traditions. Needham, like his colleague Bernal, was a Marxist. Butterfield was not. 
As a conservative Christian, Butterfield rejected Marxist history as dangerous and unrealistic. 
                                                        
32 Broad, Scientific thought, p. 12-25. 
33 Bentley, Life and thought, p. 189. 
34 Mayer, ‘Setting up the discipline’, p. 676. 
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The essential fallibility of human nature, Butterfield argued, precluded utopian schemes for the 
improvement of society.35 In terms of the sciences, this was part of a broader disagreement 
between conservative and socialist thinkers on the relationship between science and society. 
Socialist scientists like Needham and Bernal, often looking to the Soviet Union, promoted the 
idea that Britain should adopt a system of scientific and technical planning.36 Writing in The 
social function of science (1939), Bernal attacked the notion of ‘pure science’ as ‘a form of 
snobbery’. The ideal of the disinterested observer had turned science into nothing more than 
‘an amusing pastime’. And without sufficient planning, science was failing to address the 
‘problems of production or of welfare’. Whilst Bernal admitted that ‘science can never be 
administered as part of the civil service’, he nonetheless looked to the Soviet Union as an 
example of how state-led planning could transform academic research for the betterment of 
society.37 
Bernal had his supporters, but there was also plenty of opposition, both within and 
beyond the scientific profession. Liberals and conservatives worried that a planned society 
would stifle scientific creativity. In response, a group of scientists led by the chemist Michael 
Polanyi and the zoologist John Baker founded the Society for Freedom in Science. Throughout 
the 1940s, they defended the value of ‘pure science’, arguing that ‘science can only flourish 
and therefore can only confer the maximum cultural and practical benefits on society when 
                                                        
35 Reba Soffer, History, historians and conservatism in Britain and America: from the Great War to Thatcher 
and Reagan (Oxford, 2008), pp. 180-186. 
36 Mary Jo Nye, Michael Polanyi and his generation: origins of the social construction of science (Chicago, IL, 
2011), pp. 184-222, Mayer, ‘Setting up the discipline’, pp. 676-684, and Mayer, ‘Setting up the 
discipline II’, pp. 41-60. 
37 John Desmond Bernal, The social function of science (London, 1939), pp. xiii and 96-97. Other leading 
advocates of scientific planning in this period include the journalist James Crowther and the Marxist 
mathematician and founding member of the British Society for the History of Science Samuel Lilley, 
Steven Shapin, ‘Discipline and bounding: the history and sociology of science as seen through the 
externalism-internalism debate’, History of science, 30 (1992), p. 339. 
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research is conducted in an atmosphere of freedom’.38 Crucially, many of the key figures on 
the History of Science Committee under Butterfield were also members of the Society for 
Freedom in Science. These included historians such as Michael Postan as well as the few 
remaining scientists such as the physicists William Dampier and Herbert Dingle.39 The History 
of Science Committee, therefore, was dominated by a very specific politics as well as 
intellectual approach. It was a venue for conservative and liberal historians and scientists to 
promote a history of science which ran counter to socialists such as Needham and Bernal. This 
was also reflected in the pages of The Cambridge historical journal. 
 Amongst the members of the Society for the Freedom of Science was the leading 
biochemist Henry Hallett Dale. Dale had won the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 
1936 for his work on neurotransmission and spent most of his working life as Chairman of the 
Wellcome Trust, overseeing the funding of medical research. He was intimately involved in 
the politics of science, serving as both President of the Royal Society and on the government’s 
Scientific Advisory Panel during the Second World War.40 And, whilst Dale recognised the 
importance of scientific collaboration with the Soviet Union during the war, he nonetheless 
vigorously defended the value of pure science against the kind of planned scientific enterprise 
promoted by socialists like Bernal.41 Dale was therefore someone that could combine genuine 
scientific expertise along with a commitment to the values that Butterfield and the Society for 
Freedom in Science shared. With this in mind, Butterfield invited Dale to deliver a lecture as 
                                                        
38 William McGucken, ‘On freedom and planning in science: the Society for Freedom in Science, 1940-46’, 
Minerva, 16 (1978), p. 48. 
39 Mayer, ‘Setting up the discipline II’, p. 58. 
40 Elizabeth Tansey, ‘Charles Sherrington, E.D. Adrian, and Henry Dale: the Cambridge Physiological 
Laboratory and the physiology of the nervous system’, in Peter Harman and Simon Mitton (eds), 
Cambridge scientific minds (Cambridge, 2002), p. 193-196 
41 Henry Dale, ‘International collaboration and freedom of science’, Nature, 148 (1941). 
 14 
part of the 1946 programme organised by the History of Science Committee. And once again, 
Butterfield arranged for the subsequent publication in The Cambridge historical journal. 
 Dale’s lecture was on the subject of ‘Experiment in medicine’, a largely celebratory 
account of the rise of physiology and biochemistry. Dale dated the rise of what he called 
‘experimental medicine’ to the late nineteenth century, with the work of the French 
bacteriologist Louis Pasteur and the German physiologist Carl Ludwig. He then explained that 
modern experimental techniques, alongside the development of laboratories, had ‘opened the 
new era of medical progress in which we are living to-day’. The public had experimental 
physiologists to thank for antibiotics, vitamins and hormone treatments. With a patriotic 
flourish, Dale also highlighted ‘our own British Schools of Experimental Physiology’. It wasn’t 
just the Germans or the French, but ‘the inspired enterprise of our own countrymen’ that was 
responsible for the most recent advances in experimental medicine such as penicillin. Setting 
out the genealogy of British experimentalists, Dale identified a group of researchers at 
Cambridge including Michael Foster, Charles Sherrington and John Langley who had 
spearheaded ‘the revival and initiation of the experimental method’. ‘Their pupils played an 
important role in putting British physiology high in the world’s esteem’, explained Dale.42 (As 
his audience would have well known, Dale was one of those students, having studied under 
Langley and Foster.)43 Dale also emphasised the political importance of experimental medicine 
in the present. He asked his audience to compare the casualties lost to ‘enteric fever in the 
South African war, with the experience in the war just ended, in which inoculation had 
eliminated these scourges as significant military problems’. And it was the development of 
                                                        
42 Henry Dale, ‘Experiment in medicine’, The Cambridge historical journal, 8 (1946), pp. 166-178. 
43 Tansey, ‘Charles Sherrington, E.D. Adrian, and Henry Dale’, p. 193-196. 
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new drugs, such as mepacrine, ‘which made it possible for the armies to fight in the malarial 
swamps of New Guinea, when the Japanese seized the world’s major sources of quinine’.44 
 So far, so celebratory. Dale’s was a history of experimental medicine in which 
‘individual workers of genius’ – implicitly men like him – had produced unprecedented 
intellectual progress, and effectively won the Second World War in the process. But Dale also 
asked a more searching question, one that directly related to the politics of the Society for 
Freedom in Science. Like Butterfield, Dale wasn’t just interested in cataloguing progress, but 
understanding its causes. For this reason, Dale opened his lecture, not with the nineteenth 
century, but with the sixteenth. He began by examining a much earlier history of experimental 
medicine with the work of the English physicians William Gilbert and William Harvey. Dale 
identified Gilbert and Harvey as ‘the leaders in this country of the scientific revolution’. 
Together they pioneered ‘the method of direct, experimental enquiry’, with Dale crediting 
Harvey for discovering ‘the double circulation of the blood’. Why then, given these examples, 
did Dale argue that the rise of experimental medicine should be dated to the nineteenth century 
and not the sixteenth? In his view, despite the work of Gilbert and Harvey, progress in science 
and medicine had been ‘slow and capricious’ since the sixteenth century. The experimental 
method had not permeated the Royal College of Physicians, or the world of medicine at large. 
Rather, experimental medicine after Harvey had fallen ‘so largely into abeyance during more 
than two centuries’. Explaining this was the core motivation behind Dale’s lecture. He 
contrasted early modern and modern experimental medicine in order to interrogate the causes 
of scientific progress. Like Broad, this provided a means to reconcile Butterfield’s philosophy 
of history with a celebratory account of scientific advance. There had been a ‘lapse of progress’ 
                                                        
44 Dale, ‘Experiment in medicine’, p. 177. 
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before the ‘outburst of experimental activity… in the middle of the nineteenth century’. The 
question was: what had changed?45 
In answering this question, Dale implicitly attacked the Marxist histories promoted by 
Needham and Bernal. Dale, as a member of the Society for Freedom in Science, wanted to 
ensure society valued pure science. Indeed, Dale had promoted this ideal at the Wellcome 
Physiological Laboratories, encouraging scientists to produce experimental results and collect 
data apparently without particular commercial outcomes in mind.46 For Dale then, the problem 
with early modern science wasn’t a lack of ‘genius’, but the lack of freedom. Harvey lived in 
an world dominated by ‘orthodoxy and ancient tradition’.47 The same was true of the eighteenth 
century. Dale singled out the ‘plausible but fallacious phlogiston hypothesis’. This theory, 
which explained combustion through the existence of a fire-like particular rather than 
oxidation, had ‘seized the minds of [a] generation with the force of a dogma’. Without free 
thinking, Dale argued, eighteenth-century chemistry had become dominated by a theory which 
‘distorted the interpretation of all chemical observations’.48 
For Dale, the factors which had held back early modern science – dogma and distortion 
– were also on the rise in the present. Dale used his 1941 Presidential Address to the Royal 
Society to caution against allowing science to ‘become entangled with controversial politics’. 
This would lead to a world in which ‘the rigid standards of true science would be relaxed… 
allowing the convenience of results for policy or for propaganda to enter into the assessment 
of their validity as evidence’. At the same time, ‘fundamental researches, having no 
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immediately practical appeal, would be allowed to fall into arrears through relative neglect’.49 
In Dale’s view, this was exactly what was happening in the Soviet Union. Throughout the 
1930s and 1940s the agricultural biologist Trofim Lysenko, with Stalin’s backing, orchestrated 
a campaign to discredit scientific theories deemed in conflict with revolutionary Marxism. 
Mendelian genetics in particular was identified as ‘bourgeois pseudoscience’, with a number 
of leading Russian scientists being sent to prison and labour camps.50 When Dale learned of 
the imprisonment and death of the geneticist Nikolai Vavilov, he wrote to the Soviet Academy 
of Science in protest. Resigning his membership in 1948, Dale complained: 
 
This is not the result of an honest and open conflict of scientific opinions; Lysenko’s own claims 
and statements make it clear that his dogma had been established and enforced by the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party, as conforming to the political philosophy of Marx and 
Lenin… Since Galileo was drive by threats to his historic denial, there have been many attempts 
to supress or to mutilate scientific truth in the interests of some extraneous creed, but none has 
had a lasting success.51 
 
Here we see how Dale brought together his understanding of scientific freedom in the past and 
present. Whether in the twentieth century or the sixteenth century, the enemy of scientific 
progress was ‘dogma’, a word Dale returned to time and time again. Progress could only be 
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secured, Dale argued, if scientists were free to conduct research without political or practical 
ends in mind. 
 
III 
 
By the end of the 1940s, the history of science was dominated by the history of ideas.52 In 
Paris, Alexandre Koyré published his influential Études galiléennes (1939), arguing that 
Galileo’s work was best understood as an intellectual project, part of the ‘geometrization of 
space’, rather than a response to early modern manufacturing concerns. ‘Galileo did not learn 
his business from people who toiled in the arsenals and shipyards of Venice’, concluded 
Koyré.53 In the United States, George Sarton cultivated a similar philosophy of history in his 
three-volume Introduction to the history of science (1927-1948). Sarton even suggested 
collaborating with Arthur Lovejoy, founder of the Journal for the history of ideas, in which a 
number of Koyré’s essays later appeared.54 Back in Cambridge, Alfred Rupert Hall was 
appointed to the first lectureship in the history of science in 1950.55 A trained historian, rather 
than a scientist, Hall too placed the emphasis on ideas over industry. Hall’s Ballistics in the 
seventeenth century (1952) followed Koyré in denying the link between the technologies of 
early modern warfare and new developments in the sciences.56 Socialists such as the journalist 
James Crowther and the mathematician Samuel Lilley certainly continued to press for a history 
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which emphasised the relationship between science, society and industry. But they were in the 
minority, and largely excluded from new university positions designed to cement the status of 
the history of science as a discipline.57 
 The history of ideas continued to dominate, not just the history of science, but the pages 
of The historical journal more generally throughout the 1960s and 1970s.58 However, this 
period also marked a fundamental shift in the nature of intellectual history, one that had a 
profound effect on the history of science. In 1969, Quentin Skinner published his seminal 
article, ‘Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas’, in the journal History and theory. 
This exemplified a new contextualist approach to intellectual history. Skinner argued that the 
history of ideas needed to abandon its focus on ‘perennial problems’ and ‘universal truths’. 
Instead, in order to understand the meaning of an historical text, one needed to ‘trace the 
relations between the given utterance’ and the ‘wider linguistic context’.59 In making this 
argument, Skinner drew heavily on John Austin’s How to do things with words (1962). At its 
core, Skinner’s methodology advocated recovering something very specific: not simply what 
was said, but what an author intended to do by saying it. This was the distinction between what 
Austin called ‘locution’ (saying) and ‘illocution’ (meaning). In practice, this involved 
interpreting particular speech acts within the intellectual context of the time, rather than 
assuming that modern notions of the ‘state’, ‘virtue’ or even ‘politics’ could be applied to past 
texts.60 
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Today, Skinner is rightly remembered as having played a pivotal role in the 
development of intellectual history in Britain. Along with John Dunn and John Pocock, Skinner 
helped establish the Cambridge School of political thought. Grounded in a contextual study of 
the language of politics, the Cambridge School continues to shape the writing of intellectual 
history today.61 However, what is less often acknowledged is the relationship between 
Skinner’s writings and the history of science. Skinner himself was profoundly influenced by 
new approaches to the history of science, particularly the work of Thomas Kuhn in the 1960s.62 
At the same time, Skinner’s writings provided a resource for historians of science looking to 
understand what constitutes anachronism and how to place science in context.63 Skinner is 
therefore indicative of the reciprocal relationship between methodological innovation in the 
history of science and the wider historical profession. It is no coincidence, therefore, that one 
of Skinner’s earliest articles in The historical journal was on the topic of early modern science. 
Titled ‘Thomas Hobbes and the nature of the early Royal Society’, the article was published 
just a few months after ‘Meaning and understanding’. It is the first time Skinner explicitly puts 
his methodology into practice. 
The article opens with a deceptively simple question: ‘Why was Thomas Hobbes never 
made a Fellow of the Royal Society?’ Skinner then reviews typical answers to this question. 
The first possibility, advanced by historians such as Maurice Goldsmith in Hobbes’s science 
of politics (1966), is that Hobbes was excluded because his ideas were in conflict with those 
                                                        
61 Gary Browning, A history of modern political thought: the question of interpretation (Oxford, 2016), pp. 67-
88.  
62 ‘I remember being overwhelmed by Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions when I read it in the mid-
1960s’, Pallares-Burke, The new history, p. 231. Kuhn is also cited in Skinner, ‘Meaning and 
understanding’, p. 7. 
63 Nick Jardine, ‘Uses and abuses of anachronism in the history of the sciences’, History of science, 38 (2000), 
Nick Jardine, ‘Etics and emics (not to mention anemics and emetics) in the history of the sciences’, 
History of science, 42 (2004), and Nick Tosh, ‘Anachronism and retrospective explanation: in defence of 
a present-centred history of science ‘, Studies in the history and philosophy of science, 34 (2004). 
 21 
promoted by the Royal Society. Natural philosophers like Robert Boyle adopted a Baconian 
programme of experimentation, taking seriously the motto of the Royal Society: nullius in 
verba (on no one’s word). In contrast, Hobbes promoted a philosophy of nature which was 
much more Cartesian. He believed that nature could be conceived of as a machine. Political 
philosophers could then make deductive inferences concerning the relationship between the 
nature of the machine and the structure of society, exactly as Hobbes did in Leviathan (1651). 
This clash – between deductive and inductive approaches to nature – came to a head when 
Boyle claimed to have created a vacuum using an air-pump at the Royal Society in 1660. 
Hobbes rejected Boyle’s claims, and even went as far as to argue that experimental approaches 
to nature were dangerous, promoting political instability. Ultimately, for those working within 
the tradition of the history of ideas, it was Hobbes’s philosophy of nature that explained why 
he was never made a Fellow of the Royal Society. Hobbes’s exclusion was, as Goldsmith 
argued in Hobbes’s science of politics, ‘an accurate indication of his separation from the 
scientific opinion of the day’. Or, as Skinner put it more pithily, Hobbes was not made a Fellow 
‘because he was not a proper scientist’.64 
Skinner then goes on to reject this explanation as a textbook example of anachronism. 
It mistakes the values of the Royal Society in the seventeenth century with those of the Royal 
Society in the present: 
 
To think of the original Royal Society as being in essence a professional body, operating strictly 
professional standards for entry (as the Royal Society clearly does now) is to apply to the 
original Society a paradigm for the understanding of its nature which is not merely derived 
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from specifically twentieth-century experience, but which is demonstrably inapplicable as a 
description of the Society’s seventeenth-century nature.65 
 
In making this argument, Skinner directly cites ‘Meaning and understanding’. It was 
‘clearly anachronistic’ to assume that Boyle excluded Hobbes for failing to stand up to 
twentieth-century scientific standards. Intriguingly, Skinner also hints at the influence that new 
work in the history of science had on his thinking at the time. His repeated use of the word 
‘paradigm’ is a reference to Thomas Kuhn’s incredibly influential The structure of scientific 
revolutions (1962). The core of Kuhn’s argument was that scientific change could best be 
understood as the transition between incommensurable worldviews, or ‘paradigms’ as he called 
them. Paradigms are incommensurable in the sense that the language used to describe the world 
in one is incompatible with the language used to describe world in the other. (For example, the 
difference between descriptions of time in classical vs. relativisitic mechanics.)66 In this sense, 
there is a clear link between Skinner’s intellectual history and Kuhn’s history of science: both 
rely on identifying the appropriate linguistic context in which ideas are produced. Both were 
also drawing on the philosophy of language, particularly the later Wittgenstein. In subsequent 
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interviews, Skinner acknowledged that his account of Hobbes at the Royal Society was heavily 
influenced by reading Kuhn, ‘especially his insistence that we should never read back into 
earlier societies the paradigms we have for understanding our own societies and its institutions 
and practices’. Indeed, when spending time at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton in 
the 1970s, Skinner even had an office next to Kuhn. Alongside Kuhn, Skinner remembered 
how his colleagues at Princeton, particularly the anthropologist Clifford Geertz and the 
philosopher of science Richard Rorty, helped convince him that there was no ‘trans-cultural 
notion of rationality’. Instead, Skinner realised that ‘the question of what it is rational for 
someone to believe primarily depends on what else they believed, and not at all 
straightforwardly on something called the evidence or the facts’.67 
Back at Cambridge, Skinner also moved between worlds occupied by historians of 
science and historians of political thought. His article on Hobbes at the Royal Society had 
originally been written and presented as part of a monthly seminar series on the history of 
science run by Robert Young at King’s College.68 This series was meant as an antidote to the 
more traditional history of ideas promoted by Rupert Hall.69 Young, part of a new wave of 
Marxists, wanted to put the politics back into science. He found Skinner and Dunn’s intellectual 
history appealing because ‘both stressed that ideas do not beget ideas but that people do so in 
particular historical contexts and that the meaning of those ideas is exquisitely bound to the 
particularity of those contexts’.70 The keyword here is ‘context’, a category of analysis that 
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came to dominate the history of science in the 1970s and 1980s.71 Young’s own work rested 
on placing political and scientific thought in a ‘common context’, as he argued in the case of 
Charles Darwin and Thomas Malthus in Darwin’s metaphor (1985).72 Perhaps most famously, 
Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, writing in Leviathan and the air-pump (1985), argued that 
the debate between Hobbes and Boyle needed to be understood within the ‘political context’ 
of Restoration England. At a time of great social and religious instability, ‘Boyle’s 
experimentalism and Hobbes’s demonstrative way were both offered as solutions to the 
problem of order’.73 Similarly, Lawrence Goldman’s 1983 article in The historical journal 
opened by citing Skinner’s ‘Meaning and understanding’ before suggesting how such a method 
could be extended to the history of the social sciences. Goldman argued that, like earlier 
intellectual historians and scientists, sociologists were guilty of writing ‘a history that current 
practitioners can understand in terms of their own research interests’. Instead, the history of the 
social sciences needed to recover the ‘intentions’ of past historical actors ‘by closely examining 
the language used to characterize this new discipline’. Goldman, like Skinner and many 
subsequent historians of science, therefore paid close attention to the use of particular terms as 
well as their origins. (We learn that the word ‘sociology’ was coined in 1839 by Auguste 
Comte, whilst the first English use of ‘social science’ appeared in 1836.) By placing science in 
its appropriate ‘context’, Goldman ultimately concluded that ‘there was no unitary social 
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discipline in nineteenth-century Britain but a series of separate intellectual ground-plans for a 
science of society’.74 
The meaning of ‘context’ certainly changed considerably between the 1960s and 1980s. 
Whilst Skinner and his followers foregrounded intellectual and linguistic contexts, later 
historians of science such as Shapin and Schaffer placed greater emphasis on social and 
political contexts.75 But nonetheless, we can see how from the 1960s onwards interactions 
between intellectual history and the history of science produced new ways of approaching both 
subjects. Skinner, and more broadly the Cambridge School of political thought, provided a 
major reassessment of the place of Hobbes in early modern science. At the same time, Skinner 
himself was profoundly influenced by new developments in the history and philosophy of 
science, particularly those originating in the United States with Kuhn and Rorty, but also in 
Cambridge with Young. The success of Skinner’s history of political thought was, by his own 
admission, therefore at least partially dependent on insights developed to tackle the problems 
of interpreting early modern science.76  
  
IV 
 
By the late 1970s, the history of science was well-established as an independent discipline in 
Britain and the United States. Dedicated departments had been founded at Harvard, 
                                                        
74 Lawrence Goldman, ‘The origins of British ‘social science’: political economy, natural science and statistics, 
1830–1835’, The historical journal, 26 (1983), pp. 587-616. 
75 Additionally, whilst Skinner concluded that the Royal Society’s status as a ‘gentleman’s club’ was at odds 
with its scientific role, Shapin and Schaffer showed how these functions reinforced one another. 
Restoration science was a product of gentlemanly codes of conduct, Steven Shapin, ‘The house of 
experiment in seventeenth-century England’, Isis, 79 (1988), p. 390 and Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan, 
p. 14. 
76 Pallares-Burke, The new history, pp. 231-238. 
 26 
Pennsylvania, Cambridge, Leeds, UCL and Edinburgh.77 These new departments were 
increasingly staffed by professional historians and sociologists rather than scientists. This 
brought a measure of freedom. Arguments and methods no longer needed to match the 
expectations of scientists, and indeed often ran counter to the typical narratives of progress and 
modernisation.78 We have already seen how approaches in the history of political thought, not 
to mention anthropology and the philosophy of language, provided a resource for historians of 
science looking to rethink the relationship between text and context. Similar methodological 
innovations also followed from social history. The 1960s and 1970s saw the rise of a new 
generation of social historians, particularly in Britain. Typically associated with the Left, 
historians including Christopher Hill, E. P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm provided a major 
reassessment of the relationship between class, capital and the formation of the modern world. 
But it wasn’t just the Marxists. More traditional social historians, including J. H. Plumb at 
Cambridge and Asa Briggs at Sussex, continued to promote economic and institutional 
analyses of society throughout the post-war period79. Once again, the history of science played 
a significant role in this historiography. Hill, in a debate which extended across several issues 
of Past & Present, argued that both the Protestant Reformation and the Scientific Revolution 
needed to be understood as responses to the shift from agricultural to industrial labour.80 
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Similarly, Hobsbawm’s work on the industrial revolution and Thompson’s work on 
romanticism provided a Marxist reassessment of the history of technology and nature 
respectively.81 Briggs too, particularly in his history of the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC), paid close attention to the role of technology and media in shifting social relations 
during the twentieth century.82 
 This combination of social history and the history of science also found its way into 
The historical journal. In 1971, Roy MacLeod published ‘The Royal Society and the 
government grant’, a classic example of social and economic history applied to the history of 
science.83 The article, a close analysis of the development of government funding for science 
in the nineteenth century, was written whilst MacLeod worked at the Science Policy Research 
Unit (SPRU), established in 1966 at the University of Sussex. Briggs, then writing his history 
of the BBC, had encouraged MacLeod to come to Sussex following a PhD at the University of 
Cambridge. Briggs had also played an important role, along with the economist Christopher 
Freeman, in setting up the SPRU, where MacLeod set to work.84 Initially, the SPRU was 
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closely allied to the politics of Harold Wilson’s Labour government. Wilson famously argued 
that British socialism needed to be grounded in the ‘white heat’ of a new ‘scientific revolution’. 
For Labour in the 1960s and 1970s, scientific and technical progress had the potential to bring 
about sweeping changes in the structure of society, reducing economic inequality and 
increasing social mobility. This programme was closely tied to the expansion of higher 
education in post-war Britain, with the foundation of a number of new universities including 
Sussex. Briggs, a life-long Labour Party supporter, saw the history of science and technology 
as a guide to this kind of politics.85 The SPRU promoted a toned-down version of the history 
of science promoted by Marxists like Bernal in the 1940s. This was a history of science with a 
practical aim in mind. MacLeod and Briggs were not interested in the meaning of early modern 
intellectual culture. What they wanted was a history of science which could inform policy 
decisions in the present. 
 This is all reflected in MacLeod’s article. He focuses exclusively on the details of 
institutional and economic development. The article proceeds almost year-by-year, from the 
foundation of the Government Grant to the Royal Society under Lord John Russell’s 
government in the 1840s through to the consolidation of public funding for science in the run-
up to the First World War. The article is full of economic data and tables, setting out trends in 
public science funding and institutional hierarchies. MacLeod makes no apology for 
concentrating on what he calls ‘external factors’, without any attention to the intellectual 
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content of science. While he admitted that ‘externalist history, or the history of scientific 
institutions… cannot attempt to account for the highly individual, subjective, creative flashes 
of scientific insight’, he nonetheless argued ‘it is still important to enquire into the complex 
social conditions which affect the rate and direction in which discovery may occur’.86 This 
distinction, between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors, was typical of the historiography of 
science in the 1960s and 1970s. Historians argued over whether social or intellectual pressures 
should take precedence. One of the great achievements of the later sociology of science was to 
break down this divide. But in the context of Cold War science policy, such a distinction made 
sense.87  It allowed historians like MacLeod to cut away the content of science and offer policy 
recommendations for impatient civil servants. 
 MacLeod’s goal was to ‘assess the relative influence of institutions on scientific 
progress’ and ‘to analyse the elusive consequences of decisions taken’. In adopting this 
approach, MacLeod offered ‘a means of examining growth patterns in science over time’. 
Broadly, MacLeod argued that the Royal Society had initially been resistant to accepting public 
funds. Traditionally, the authority of a man of science rested on his gentlemanly status. The 
professionalisation of science in the nineteenth century challenged this model of scientific 
prestige.88 For Victorian gentlemen, it also raised questions of control and corruption. 
Government funding might bring ‘personal jobbery and bureaucratic formalism’ to scientific 
institutions, thus undermining established norms of conduct and patronage. Nonetheless, as the 
Victorian era wore on, both the state and the scientists came to accept closer institutional and 
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financial links. MacLeod argued that this was a result of two major pressures. First, competition 
with other European states brought scientists and politicians together. There was a worry 
throughout the nineteenth century that French and German science, with state backing, was 
overtaking that in Britain. Whether true or not, this provided a powerful piece of rhetoric for 
those keen to increase state funding for science. Second, criticism of the elite nature of the 
Royal Society opened up science, and its funding, to a wider range of practitioners. Men like 
Thomas Henry Huxley argued that science should not simply be the preserve of the London 
elite, where most of the initial state funding was concentrated, but should be distributed 
regionally and across different social groups.89 
 MacLeod then used this broad historical analysis to draw more pointed policy 
conclusions. First, he argued that state funding of science had been partly responsible for the 
‘growth of different disciplines in science’. Second, MacLeod argued that public funding of 
science was also responsible for the growing divide between ‘pure science and technology’. 
Third, MacLeod raised ‘the problem of regionalism’, whereby state funding tended to be 
concentrated in London, and failed to permeate across northern Britain, as well as Ireland and 
Scotland. And finally, MacLeod questioned whether public funding of science functioned as a 
form of state support or ‘more as a reward system’. Referencing the American sociologist 
Robert Merton, MacLeod even suggested that the history of the Royal Society might reveal ‘a 
Victorian version of the “Matthew Rule”’, supporting established scientists rather than 
‘encouraging unorthodox, “revolutionary”, ideas’.90 These conclusions reflected the politics of 
the SPRU. How to fund science in the context of emerging disciplines, often with significant 
differences in economic cost, proved an enduring policy question, one just as applicable to the 
1970s as to the 1870s. Similarly, how to ensure that the benefits of science and technology 
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were spread evenly across the United Kingdom, particularly in the north and Scotland, was a 
constant preoccupation of the Wilson government. The decline in traditional British industries 
– textiles, coal mining, steel manufacture – was not good for Labour, something the party learnt 
to its cost following the Winter of Discontent and the 1979 General Election. And finally, we 
see the re-emergence of tensions between state planning and scientific freedom. Wilson’s 
policy advisors, including those at the SPRU, recognised the need to balance state aid with 
intellectual creativity. Examining the history of the Government Grant in the nineteenth 
century provided an opportunity to reflect on the workings of state funding and scientific 
freedom in the present.91 
 
 
V 
 
The 1990s marked the ‘end of social history’. Or at least some people thought so.92 In place of 
society and economics, historians increasingly turned towards culture as a guide to 
understanding the past.93 The cultural turn had its origins in a variety of intellectual movements, 
many stretching back to the 1960s and 1970s. In France, the growth of postmodernist and 
poststructuralist philosophy, exemplified by the work of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, 
forced historians to rethink many of the categories underpinning classic social analysis. 
‘Society’, ‘class’, even the ‘individual’, were all revealed as products of Enlightenment 
discourse, cultural constructs rather than structural elements of human life. In Britain, a similar 
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rejection of structural analysis helped usher in the ‘new’ social history, with its focus on 
language, popular culture and everyday experience. At the same time, in the United States, 
many cultural historians drew on the work of anthropologists, particularly Clifford Geertz and 
his ‘interpretative theory of culture’. Drawing on all these traditions, cultural history really took 
off in Britain and the United States in the 1980s and 1990s. With the growth of neoliberalism 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union, cultural analysis found its place in a world obsessed with 
individualism.94 Like anthropologists, historians now looked to examine how identities, such 
as gender and race, were constructed through cultural representations. There was a certain 
literary bent to this early work, with a focus on the cultural meaning of texts. However, cultural 
history soon expanded beyond literary texts: visual culture, material culture, practices and 
performance all came to be understood, again, in the mode of anthropologist, as central to the 
construction of meaning.95  
The key term here was ‘construction’. Whereas previous generations of historians of 
science had been content to work with ‘internal’ and ‘external’ categories, this division looked 
increasingly suspicious to cultural historians. In what sense could science be located within a 
pre-existing social context, when cultural historians had shown that society itself was a 
construct? Instead, historians of science from the 1980s onwards started producing new studies 
showing how everything from protons to hormones needed to be understood as culturally 
constructed. At this time, historians of science were particularly well placed to make this move, 
as many were already dealing with similar theoretical problems through the sociology of 
scientific knowledge (SSK). Grounded in sociology, but also drawing on anthropology and 
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postmodernism, SSK advanced a radical rethinking of notions of truth and objectivity, as well 
as a breakdown of the division between the scientific content and context. Truth and knowledge 
were social or cultural constructs, rather than fixed elements of reality. Pioneers of SSK 
included David Bloor in Edinburgh, Harry Collins in Bath and, through his work on actor-
network theory, Bruno Latour in Paris.96 Much of the most original work in the history of 
science in the 1980s and 1990s followed, more or less explicitly, the methodology advanced 
by proponents of SSK and cultural history.97 With science understood as part of wider culture, 
historians of science found it easier to work with and publish alongside general historians. This 
is reflected in a flurry of articles on the cultural history of science published in The historical 
journal in the 1990s and 2000s.98 
These articles also reveal the range of approaches to cultural history that historians of 
science engaged with, ranging from book history to imperial history. Aileen Fyfe’s article, 
‘Reading children’s books in late eighteenth-century dissenting families’, is a classic example 
of a technique of cultural history applied to the history of science.99 The history of the book, 
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and more specifically the history of reading, had been pioneered as a method of cultural history 
by scholars of eighteenth-century France, particularly Robert Darnton and Roger Chartier. 
Darnton and Chartier had showed how events like the French Revolution had their origins in 
culture rather than simply economic or social change. What’s more, both Darnton and Chartier 
emphasised the history of the book as a way to recover cultural meaning.100 Darton also 
engages seriously with the relationship between knowledge and print, particularly in his study 
of Diderot’s Encyclopédie (1751-1772).101 Fyfe follows this methodology, citing Darnton’s 
influential collection of essays The great cat massacre (1984). However, she applies it to a 
very different context. Fyfe reconstructs the cultural meaning of children’s books on natural 
history in eighteenth-century Britain. This, by her own admission, is a difficult task. Children 
rarely leave a record of their reading experiences. So instead, Fyfe follows cultural historians 
like Darnton in reconstructing attitudes towards reading and associated practices. She skilfully 
shows how different religious groups promoted a variety of approaches to reading children’s 
books, reflecting different attitudes to the relationship between God, morality and the natural 
world in eighteenth-century Britain. Drawing on techniques pioneered by literary scholars and 
the new cultural history, Fyfe establishes this argument through the close reading of an 
individual text, John and Anna Aikin’s Evenings at home (1792-1796).102 
It wasn’t just children’s books or ‘forbidden bestsellers’ which caught the attention of 
cultural historians. The history of the book opened up the study of popular culture more 
generally. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, historians expanded their understanding of ‘texts’ 
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to include theatre, music and art. Nowhere was this more powerful than in the history of race. 
Historians of science had always been well placed to engage with the history of racial thought. 
Typically, they did so from the perspective of intellectual history, charting major theoretical 
changes in how concepts of race, ethnicity and human difference were understood. Nancy 
Stepan’s The idea of race in science (1982) epitomises this approach. She identifies an 
intellectual shift from social understandings of race in the eighteenth century towards more 
biological understandings of race in the nineteenth.103 However, the turn towards cultural 
history opened up a radically different way of approaching the history of race. Rather than 
studying elite intellectual change, historians of science argued that racial thought was 
embodied in popular culture. Exhibitions, museums, posters and songs all worked to construct 
racial difference. What’s more, popular culture wasn’t marginal, but actually played a major 
role in the development of scientific ideas. 
These arguments are all developed in detail by Sadiah Qureshi in her article entitled 
‘Robert Gordon Latham, displayed peoples, and the natural history of race, 1854-1866’. The 
article focuses on the work of the ethnologist Robert Gordon Latham, author of Natural history 
of the varieties of man (1854) and curator of the court of natural history at the Crystal Palace 
in Sydenham in 1854. Qureshi makes the case that the Crystal Palace, and other exhibitions of 
displayed peoples, were sites for the making of scientific and racial knowledge. Adopting the 
techniques of the cultural historian, Qureshi recovers in great detail the layout of particular 
exhibits as well as analyses images in popular magazines. She draws on a contemporary 
guidebook to reveal how models of Zulus, San and Javanese peoples were incorporated into 
the natural history display at the Crystal Palace. However, as Qureshi herself notes, ‘visitors 
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did not necessarily follow the advice of guidebooks’. Qureshi therefore balances her analysis 
of the exhibition space with an examination of other contemporary documents: satirical images 
from Punch magazine and reviews of the natural history court in Victorian periodicals. 
Together, these sources of popular culture allow Qureshi to establish a much more complex 
history of racial thought, challenging the earlier work of Stepan. As Qureshi concludes, ‘the 
mid-nineteenth-century saw a substantial proliferation, not homogenization, of intellectual and 
methodological approaches accompanying the scholarly study of human variation’.104 Here, 
we see exactly how cultural history augments the existing intellectual history. By drawing on 
cultural artefacts – guidebooks, images, diaries and letters – Qureshi is able to show how 
meanings associated with human difference proliferated. This then challenges an older 
narrative which appears increasingly homogenising and monolithic.105 
Qureshi’s attention to race points towards another major development in the 
historiography of science in the 1990s: the turn towards imperial and global history. 
Throughout the Cold War, historians in the West tended to assume that science was something 
done in Europe, and its history therefore centred on Britain, France, Italy and Germany.106 We 
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have seen this already in the articles published in The historical journal. From Broad in the 
1940s to MacLeod in the 1970s, the history of science was a history of white men in Europe. 
(Not coincidentally, it was also a history written by white men in Europe.) Following the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, cultural history opened up an intellectual space in which a variety of other 
geographies and identities could be incorporated: women, people of colour and colonised 
subjects all found a place in the history of science in the 1990s and 2000s. This is reflected in 
a series of articles published in The historical journal  which connected science to the cultural 
history of empire. 
In 2005, Sujit Sivasundaram published ‘Trading knowledge: the East India Company’s 
elephants in India and Britain’. The article argues that, in the context of nineteenth-century 
natural history, ‘collaborations between colonizer and colonized’ produced ‘hybrid forms of 
natural knowledge’. British naturalists drew on earlier Mughal understandings of elephants as 
symbols of military power, whilst also examining ancient Hindu texts for clues as to 
classification. In making this argument, Sivasundaram explicitly draws on cultural history. He 
is interested in ‘the representation of the non-European’, and makes the case for the study of 
popular culture alongside elite. But Sivasundaram also pushes cultural history beyond its 
typical European focus. ‘Cultural historians of Britain’, Sivasundaram argues, should ‘pay 
attention to the arrival of Indian traditions in the metropole. Knowledges from colonized lands 
were appropriated and reinvented, they did not disappear powerless in the face of conquest, 
and neither were they isolated to colonial territories’.107 
Here, Sivasundaram is responding to an earlier tradition within the history of science 
and empire. In 1967, George Basalla published ‘The spread of Western science’. An influential 
diffusionist account, Basalla’s model was made up of three phases. In phase one, ‘the non-
scientific society or nation provides a source for European science’. In phase two, European 
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science is done in the colonies, with the establishment of laboratories and universities. In phase 
three, postcolonial states ‘struggle to achieve an independent scientific tradition’. In identifying 
these three phases, Basalla drew direct inspiration from Walt Rostow’s The stages of economic 
growth: a non-communist manifesto (1960). Basalla’s article was in effect a Cold War science 
policy document: its chief aim was to explain and recommend colonial and postcolonial science 
policies which could aid the United States in its fight against Communism. Basalla notes that 
the Soviet Union had recently ‘reached, and in some cases surpassed, the science of Western 
European nations’. Basalla concludes his article with an assessment of those countries which 
he believed were most likely to develop independent scientific traditions. He claims ‘China 
and India, and perhaps some South American and African countries’ show ‘great potential for 
future scientific growth’. However, he then acknowledges the ‘major obstacles to be overcome 
before they establish their independent scientific cultures’. The fear running throughout 
Basalla’s paper is the possibility of Soviet intervention in postcolonial science: here 
‘independent scientific cultures’ meant independence from Communism.108 
This model remained incredibly influential in the historiography of science well into 
the 1980s. Earlier histories of science and empire tended to follow Basalla in treating the 
relationship between colony and metropole as relatively fixed and one-way.109 But with the fall 
of the Soviet Union, Basalla’s model looked increasingly outdated. The development of 
postcolonial and subaltern studies, alongside the new imperial history of Catherine Hall and 
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Kathleen Wilson, provided an alternative framework for understanding science and empire.110  
Instead of emphasising the power of the metropole over the colony, postcolonial scholars and 
new imperial historians alike recovered the variety of ways in which colonised people exerted 
agency, both in the colony but importantly back in Britain too. This challenged the one-way 
model for the flow of scientific knowledge, and opened up a space in which a variety of 
knowledge traditions could contribute to the making of modern science, both in the colony and 
the metropole.111 When Sivasundaram talks of ‘hybrid forms of natural knowledge’ and the 
role of ‘Indian  traditions in the metropole’, this is exactly what he has in mind. For 
Sivasundaram, India already had an independent scientific tradition, well before the arrival of 
the British. Crucially, this argument relies on a move that became increasingly common 
following the cultural turn. Sivasundaram frames his argument in terms of ‘knowledge’ rather 
than ‘science’.112 This allows him to incorporate a much broader range of sources and historical 
actors. He analyses East India Company records, articles published by the Royal Society in 
London, Vedic texts and Mughal histories. This attention to a range of alternative European 
and non-European sources, read against one another, came to characterise one mode of writing 
the global history of science.113 It also allowed historians of science, like Sivasundaram, to 
make serious contributions to South Asian and imperial history more generally. Indeed, 
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Sivasundaram’s career reflects this. After coming to Cambridge to study engineering and the 
natural sciences, he completed a PhD in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science 
under James A. Secord. However, following a research fellowship, Sivasundaram joined the 
Department of International History at the London School of Economics. He then returned to 
Cambridge, but this time to join the History Faculty as Lecturer and then Reader in World 
History. Today, he is co-editor of The historical journal. Sivasundaram’s transition, from 
scientist to historian, exemplifies a trend in which historians of science increasingly found their 
home in history departments.114 With science firmly established as part of wider culture, the 
history of science was finally considered a legitimate subject for general historical study.  
 
VI 
 
In the 1940s, the editor of The historical journal, Herbert Butterfield, argued the history of 
science was too important to be left to scientists. He was right.115 However, Butterfield 
probably wouldn’t have predicted that, once the history of science professionalised, it would 
transform the wider discipline of history itself. Today, the co-editor of The historical journal, 
along with two other members of the editorial board, are trained historians of science.116 This 
‘Retrospect’ article has examined the history of that transformation: from the history of science 
as a discipline practised primarily by scientists to one that has found its place within the wider 
historical profession today. Drawing on articles published in The historical journal, it has 
necessarily been an exercise focused on the historiography of science as it developed in the 
Anglophone world. Different traditions in the historiography of science developed in 
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Continental Europe, India, China, Africa and the Americas during the same period.117 More 
work still needs to be done to integrate these historiographies alongside the one I have 
recovered here.118 More broadly, this article argued that we need to situate the development of 
the history of science within the broader historiographical landscape. Historians of science 
have spent a lot of time examining the connection between their discipline and philosophy, 
anthropology and sociology. But they rarely reflect on the relation between the history of 
science and the discipline of history itself. This article has demonstrated how major changes in 
the practice of history, from the intellectual history of the 1960s through to the cultural history 
of the 1990s, transformed the ways in which the history of science was written. It also 
demonstrated that the intellectual traffic was two-way. Work in the history of science played a 
major role in the development of 1960s political thought, 1970s social history, and 1990s 
cultural history. The history of science therefore played an important role in the development 
of twentieth-century historiography more generally. In concluding, I want to offer some 
thoughts on the future of the history of science. What has been gained and what has been lost 
over the last seventy years?  
To begin with, there is clearly a growing separation between the history of science and 
the philosophy of science. Whereas in the 1940s someone like C. D. Broad could write the 
history of science, and draw philosophical lessons, today most philosophers concern 
themselves only with conceptual analysis of scientific terms. Their work is, almost by 
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definition, ahistorical. This isn’t just a problem in the history of science. Philosophers and 
historians more generally used to work much more closely together. But historians of science 
and philosophers of science are still often housed in the same department, as they are in 
Cambridge. The question of the value of these two disciplines working together is therefore 
more pertinent.119 For some, the solution is to practise an ‘integrated history and philosophy of 
science’, as advocated by Hasok Chang. In many ways, this operates rather like Broad’s 
philosophy of science in the 1940s and Kuhn’s in the 1960s. It uses historical episodes to draw 
philosophical conclusions concerning the nature of science, whether that be in terms of method 
or concepts. Chang in particular advocates using the history of science as a guide to discovering 
forgotten scientific theories that might be useful today. Here the history of science works for 
the scientist as well as the philosopher.120 Whilst one can see the attraction of this approach, it 
is ultimately hard to square the circle of a commitment to historicism with a desire for trans-
historical philosophical conclusions. Much of the work since the 1960s, and particularly 
following the cultural turn of the 1990s, has demonstrated that there are very few general 
conclusions to be drawn concerning the sciences. Once the meaning of science proliferates, as 
it did under the cultural turn, it is hard to sustain many philosophical conclusions, even those 
concerning specific scientific concepts such as fitness or quantum states. All that is left is a 
rather empty commitment to pluralism. 
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What then for the history and philosophy of science? My view is that historians of 
science and philosophers of science could find common ground in the field of political 
philosophy. Indeed, the history of political thought is one of the few sub-disciplines which still 
maintains an active connection to philosophy. Scholars following Skinner have demonstrated 
how you can balance a commitment to historicism with a desire to understand political concepts 
more generally. For example, they are able to chart the history of liberalism in order to better 
understand the ways in which liberalism functions in the present, even offering normative 
judgements about what could be done to improve a particular political philosophy.121 One could 
imagine a similar move in the history of science. Whereas much of the current philosophy of 
science is concerned with analysing scientific concepts, there is little attention to what 
underlying political philosophies these represent. To take one example, the debate between 
proponents of biological and cultural evolution is seen as a conceptual problem.122 But 
historians of science would argue that there are different political philosophies underlying these 
theories.123 How might this work in practice? One could imagine a team of historians and 
philosophers charting the changing nature of evolutionary theory, and the underlying political 
philosophies accompanying these theories. They could then use this history to explore the 
politics of biological and cultural evolution today, even suggesting how the debate between 
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different theorists might be resolved at a political rather than conceptual level. What we need 
then is not an integrated history and philosophy of science but a political philosophy of science. 
This leads me to a broader point about the nature of the history of science today. As 
this collection of articles demonstrates, the history of science as a discipline developed in 
response to Cold War politics. From an emphasis on socialist planning to a concern with 
postcolonial science, the clash between communism and capitalism structured how historians 
approached the sciences. Within this context, much of the history of science worked as a form 
of critique against the scientific establishment. With the threat of nuclear war, the growth of 
the military-industrial complex, and the immense power invested in scientists, engineers and 
doctors, it is easy to understand why. To an extent, this continued in the immediate aftermath 
of the fall of the Berlin Wall. If anything, the 1990s and early 2000s produced an even greater 
concentration in the power of science. Pharmaceuticals, mobile phones, and the internet all 
penetrated deeper and deeper into everyday life. Once again, historians of science, particularly 
feminist and postcolonial scholars, used history as a form of critique. Yet at the same time, 
many found the new cultural approach to society, filled with competing identity and truth 
claims, profoundly troubling. The ‘science wars’ and ‘culture wars’ of the 1990s highlight this 
best. They also reveal the ways in which neoliberalism permeated the historiography. For better 
or worse, everything was up for grabs in the marketplace: identity, culture, even truth itself.124 
The world, however, has changed. But has the history of science? Today, the problems 
we face are less a consequence of scientific power and more a problem of wilful ignorance. 
We live in an era of ‘fake news’ and climate change denial. We are told by politicians that 
people have ‘had enough of experts’.125 International technology companies refuse to pay tax, 
                                                        
124 For an overview of these debates, see Keith Ashman and Phillip Barringer (eds), After the science wars: 
science and the study of science (London, 2000), James Hunter, Culture wars: the struggle to define 
America (New York, NY, 1991) and Rodgers, Age of fracture, pp. 1-14 and 77-110. 
125 Michael Gove, interview with Faisal Islam, Sky News, broadcast 3 June 2016. 
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whilst university funding is cut. For those of us teaching the history of science, the critiques 
popular in the 1980s and 1990s don’t seem to hold the same weight with students. What good 
is it telling an undergraduate, born in the twenty-first century, that we should be suspicious of 
scientific truth. They live in a world in which the President of the United States thinks the same 
thing, albeit for very different reasons. How then can we write the history of science in a post-
communist and post-truth world? It would be a mistake, for sure, to abandon critique. Whilst 
some are tempted to return to the old model of history as a cheerleader for science, what we 
actually need is more politics, not less. My view is that the history of science needs to reengage 
with political thought. The cultural history of the 1990s, whilst it produced a range of important 
contributions, many of which I rely on in my own work, was nonetheless of its time. It also 
had the effect of shifting the emphasis away from political philosophy. That isn’t to say that 
the cultural history of science was apolitical. Far from it. The cultural history of science was 
wrapped up in a range of political endeavours, particularly feminism and postcolonialism. 
However, in placing an emphasis on culture over society and economics, the cultural history 
of science ended up privileging individual identities over collective experience. Much of the 
history of science written today, including my own, is microhistory. How to reconcile the close 
study of individual experience with a wider appeal to the ‘big picture’ is one of the great 
challenges facing historians of science.126 
I would argue that the best way to do this is to take inspiration from new work in the 
history of political thought and political philosophy. The time in which historians of science 
operated like political philosophers was relatively short lived.127 In the 1940s, socialist 
historians of science like Bernal and Needham certainly saw the history of science as a way of 
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doing politics. The same was true of Robert Young and the many students he inspired at 
Cambridge in the 1970s.128 But since the 1980s, the history of science and the history of 
political thought have drifted apart. At Cambridge this division is reinforced through separate 
departments, book series and degree courses. Few historians of science see their work as part 
of political philosophy today. And few historians of political thought demonstrate serious 
engagement with the history of science. When they do write about the sciences, the focus tends 
to be on the economic and social sciences over disciplines such as mathematics, chemistry and 
physics.129 There is also a tendency to approach the sciences from the perspective of the history 
of ideas, with little recognition of the ways in which historians of science since the 1980s have 
increasingly framed their work in terms of material culture or practice. My contention is that 
both groups – historians of science and historians of political thought – still have a lot to learn 
from one another. Historians of science could better engage with broader questions in political 
philosophy, whilst historians of political thought might begin to treat ideas as embodied in 
objects and practice rather than simply language. 
If this proposition is so attractive, why isn’t it happening more regularly?130 Part of the 
problem is institutional. But this divide is also a product of the historiography itself, something 
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this article has tried to correct. We tend to think of the history of science as a separate discipline 
from the start, whereas in fact there has been a series of exchanges with the wider historical 
profession stretching right back to the 1930s. At the same time, classic texts like Leviathan and 
the air-pump are remembered as works of social or cultural history, rather than part of the 
history of political thought.131 But the success of Leviathan and the air-pump in particular 
relied on bridging the divide between how we write about politics and how we write about 
science. It wasn’t simply a micro-historical episode in Restoration culture. Rather, the history 
of the dispute between Boyle and Hobbes revealed something about the political philosophy of 
Restoration England writ large.132 The aim of the book, as Shapin and Schaffer set out in the 
original text, was to ‘show the nature of the intersection between the history of natural 
philosophy and the history of political thought and action’.133 Significantly, this was also an 
argument grounded in the study of scientific practice and instrumentation rather than ideas and 
language. A history of ‘action’ as much as ‘thought’. Perhaps this is why it met with such a 
cool reception amongst traditional Hobbes scholars at the time.134 
What then for the history of science? Rather than celebrating or challenging scientific 
authority, the history of science should help scholars and students understand exactly what is 
at stake politically when people invoke scientific theories or make truth claims. When Donald 
Trump denies climate change, he is making a political claim, not just about the climate, but 
about the nature of society. (The same is true of course of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change.) What’s more, climate change isn’t just an idea. It is embodied in a whole 
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range of material practices: from thermometers in the Arctic to international meetings of 
scientific experts.135 For me, then, the history of science is a particularly powerful way of doing 
the history of political thought and action. It grounds ideas in the material world in a way few 
disciplines can match. What remains is to transform the history of science into a way of doing 
political philosophy as well.136 
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